Yellow Bellied Flycatcher

The Reagan peace plan, also known as the Reagan Middle East peace plan, was announced by United States president Ronald Reagan during a speech on September 1, 1982.^[1] The plan's stated goals was to "reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians." It proposed a five-year transition period, during which Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would obtain full autonomy, and an association of the territories with Jordan.^[2]

The West Bank and Gaza came under Israel's de facto rule during the Six-Day War fifteen years prior. Despite this, Jordan continued to claim the West Bank as its sovereign territory. During this period, Jewish settlements began forming in the West Bank, with their construction accelerating after the right-wing Likud came to power in Israel in 1977.^[3] The number of settlers increased by 70 percent between 1981 and 1982.^[4]

The Camp David Accords, signed between Israel and Egypt with American mediation in 1978, stipulated that the Palestinians must achieve 'full autonomy' and that Israel should withdraw to 'specific military locations' in the West Bank. Conversely, the Soviet-backed Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), recognized by the U.N. as the representative of the Palestinian people, rejected the 'Camp David conspiracy', believing it detracted from "the complete liberation of all the land of Palestine."^[5][6] To curtail the PLO's influence, Israeli authorities suppressed any advocacy for Palestinian nationalism.^[4]

The new Reagan administration took office in January 1981. Reagan's preoccupation with Communist threats meant that he viewed America's cooperation with Israel primarily as a means to contain the common Soviet threat, rather than to advance the prospects of Israeli-Arab peace.^[7] He was also described as being influenced by the Israeli narrative of the conflict.^[4]

The 1982 Lebanon War resulted in the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon. At the same time, the American public's outrage at the death and destruction during the siege of Beirut prompted the Reagan Administration to propose a peace plan.^[8]

The plan was based on the outcomes of the Camp David Accords, as well as Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Some commentators have described the contents of the plan as "vaguely worded".^[9]

The following main points were outlined in a statement by Secretary Shultz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 10, 1982:

Israeli Sovereignty/Palestinian State. It is the President's belief that the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved through Israeli sovereignty or control over the West Bank and Gaza. Accordingly, we will not support such a solution. We will also not support the formation of a Palestinian state in those negotiations. There is no foundation of political support in Israel or in the United States for such a solution and peace cannot be achieved by that route. The preference we will pursue in the final status negotiations is some form of association of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan.^[10]

Self-determination. In the Middle East context, the term "self-determination" has been identified exclusively with the formation of a Palestinian state. We will not support this definition of self-determination. We do believe that the Palestinians must take a leading role in determining their own future and fully support the provisions in the Camp David agreement providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement in the final status negotiations.^[10]

Jerusalem. We will fully support the position that Jerusalem must be undivided and that its status must be determined through negotiations. We do not recognize unilateral acts with respect to final status issues.^[10]

Settlements. The status of Israeli settlements must be determined in the course of the final status negotiations. We will not support their continuation as extraterritorial outposts, but neither will we support efforts to deny Jews the opportunity to live in the West Bank and Gaza under the duly constituted governmental authority there, as Arabs live in Israel.^[10]

The plan suggested a five year transition period, during which the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip obtain full autonomy over their affairs. Its purpose would be to prove that the Palestinians are capable of managing their own affairs, and that Palestinian autonomy would not pose a threat to Israel's security.^[11]

The Israeli Government, led by Menachem Begin, and the Knesset, opposed the initiative.^[10] According to Shlomo Ben-Ami, Reagan's Plan served as a signal to the Likud leadership, that the United States would not allow the Lebanon War to serve as a prelude to the annexation of the West Bank by Israel.^[12] At the same time, the Israeli Labor Party and the Peace Now movement welcomed Reagan's plan.^[9]

The PLO's chairman, Yasser Arafat, and the Palestinian National Council rejected Reagan's plan and any deal with Jordan, asserting that "the confirmation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people contradicts the existence of the Zionist state." During the PNC meeting in February 1983, the council reiterated the PLO's previous stance that Israel must be eliminated from the map without any compromise. However, some moderate voices within the PLO, such as Isam Sartawi, called for realism and noted positive points in the proposal.^[13] King Hussein of Jordan attempted to make Arafat enter negotiations but ultimately failed.^[14]

The Arab League did not directly address the initiative but presented its own proposal, the Fahd Plan, which conflicted with Reagan's proposal on key issues.^[10] Among the notable disagreements were the Palestinian right of return and the total dismantlement of settlements.

• Fahd Plan
• Israeli–Palestinian peace process

• Aruri, Naseer H.; Moughrabi, Fouad M. (1983). "The Reagan Middle East Initiative". Journal of Palestine Studies. 12 (2): 10–30. doi:10.2307/2536411. JSTOR 2536411.
• Christison, Kathleen (1999). Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-21717-1.
• Rubin, Barry M.; Rubin, Judith Colp (2003). Yasir Arafat: a political biography. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195166897.
• Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2007). Scars of war, wounds of peace: the Israeli-Arab tragedy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195325423.

• Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East, September 1, 1982
• Statement by Secretary Schultz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee outlining the Peace Initiative, September 10, 1982