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The United Nations drug control conventions, also known as the international drug control conventions, are three complementary and mutually supportive drug treaties that establish the legal framework for international drug control and the war on drugs. The treaties are the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961; amended in 1972), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). Their core function is to maintain a list of controlled drugs, ensure a consistent supply of these drugs for medical and scientific purposes, and prohibit other uses. Adoption is near universal among UN member states; each party is required to implement the treaty provisions in their country's domestic law, which allows a degree of interpretative flexibility at the national level.

The conventions

The three treaties are complementary and mutually supportive.[1] The core goals are to maintain a list of controlled drugs, to ensure a consistent supply for medical and scientific use, and to otherwise prevent production and distribution of those drugs (with some limited exceptions and exemptions).[2][3] Adoption of the treaties is near universal among the UN's 193 member states.[4][5]

The treaties are not self-executing, they operate indirectly by providing a skeleton template of provisions that have to be fleshed out in the domestic law of each party state.[3][6] Thus each country has a degree of flexibility in conforming treaty obligations to their own socio-cultural, political and economic realities;[2] this latitude has been described as a "vast grey area ... subject to judicial interpretation and political contestation."[7]

The cornerstone[8] Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended in 1972) integrates into a single framework nine pre-existing international drug treaties dating back to 1912.[9] The subsequent two conventions addressed new developments and concerns; around 250 substances in total are listed across the three.[10] Each of the conventions has an official Commentary, a detailed legal analysis providing guidance for interpretation.[11][12]

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 was adopted in 1961, entered into force on December 13, 1964[13] and as amended by the 1972 Protocol[14]186 states are party to it.[5][note 1] According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Single Convention aims to "combat drug abuse" by limiting "the possession, use, trade in, distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes" and through "international cooperation to deter and discourage drug traffickers."[15] The Single Convention classifies drugs in four schedules; Schedules I and IV are the most prohibitive and included opium, heroin, cocaine and cannabis (in 2020, cannabis was removed from the most restrictive Schedule IV[16]).

Convention on Psychotropic Substances

The Convention on Psychotropic Substances was adopted in 1971 and entered into force on August 16, 1976,[6] with184 states party to it.[5] It addresses a number of synthetic psychotropic substances, such as amphetamines, barbiturates, and LSD, that had become widely used since World War II, and especially in the 1960s, that were generally not regulated internationally.[9] According to the UNODC, the convention "responded to the diversification and expansion of the spectrum of drugs of abuse and introduced controls over a number of synthetic drugs according to their abuse potential on the one hand and their therapeutic value on the other."[17] The convention classifies the drugs it concerns in a four-schedule system different in nature from the Single Convention schedules.[9]

Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was adopted in 1988 and entered into force on November 11, 1990,[18] with 191 states party to it.[5] The convention addressed concern over the rapid growth in international drug trafficking.[19] According to the UNODC, the convention "provides comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, including provisions against money laundering and the diversion of precursor chemicals."[20] It essentially "criminalized the entire drug market chain, from cultivation/production to shipment, sale, and possession."[21]

Philosophy, origins, architects

The UN drug conventions offer a degree of interpretative flexibility within a framework of control through prohibition.[22][23] Controlled substances used for medical or scientific purposes are regulated, while other uses are prohibited:[24] "each of the treaties encourages – and often requires – that member countries put in place strong domestic penal provisions."[9]

A report on the history of the conventions identifies four themes as critical influences on the nature of the treaties: prohibition, United States involvement, external influences, and the outsized impact of certain powerful individuals.[9] Prohibition, "as opposed to regulation", has been the central philosophy. The US has been "the key player in most multilateral negotiations" and the prohibitionist approach "derives largely from U.S. policy – the various forms, past and present, of the U.S. 'war on drugs'". Outside interests, including "racism, fear, economic interests, domestic and international politics, global trade, domestic protectionism, war, arms control initiatives, the Cold War, development aid, and various corporate agendas", significantly shaped the conventions. And powerful personalities played outsized roles in shaping the policies: "while in positions of power at opportune moments, their beliefs, morals, ambitions and single-minded determination enabled them to exert exceptional influence over the shape of the international drug control regime." The efforts from the 1930s to the 1960s of US drug control commissioner Harry Anslinger and his Canadian counterpart and policy ally, Charles Henry Ludovic Sharman, are particularly notable.[9][25][26]

Administrative structure

Four entities are given authority under the drug conventions: the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

The 53-member CND, a subsidiary organ of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), is the UN's main drug policy body, responsible for the drug classification schedules and policy guidance. Members are elected by ECOSOC, one of the six UN main organs.[27][28] The CND also is the governing body of the UNODC,[29] which advises governments on implementation of the conventions and produces an annual World Drug Report. UNODC's focus is mainly on security and law enforcement, rather than public health.[3]

The INCB is an independent treaty body, mandated by the Single Convention, that monitors implementation of the conventions, oversees the legal drug supply, and maintains discussions with countries regarding compliance issues. Central to its function is an annual set of reports, submitted to ECOSOC through the CND, that overlook the global drug situation. The reporting identifies and predicts problem trends and suggests corrective actions. Technical reports list estimated national requirements, and production, manufacture, trade and consumption data, for controlled drugs for medical and scientific use, gathered from individual countries. Trends in trafficking in precursors and essential chemicals for illicit drug manufacture, and evaluation of government measures taken to prevent that traffic, are also reported. The INCB can call out non-compliance in its reports and in public statements, and by alerting the CND and ECOSOC.[3][30]

The WHO is responsible for providing the CND with the scientific evidence used in determining drug scheduling and treaty amendments.[3]

Obligations

The conventions are legally binding on its parties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).[31][32][note 2] In case of fundamental disagreements, the INCB engages in discussion; states can also withdraw from the conventions. Falling out of compliance or withdrawal, apart from denunciation by the UN, could have practical consequences, particularly for developing nations. The conventions regulate trade in legal pharmaceuticals, including the WHO list of essential drugs—leaving the system could make securing medicine more difficult. Being party to the three conventions is also a requirement for certain trade agreements, and for access to the European Union (EU).[2]

The drug conventions do not explicitly prohibit, they establish control over a set of drugs. The use of drugs – personal consumption – is not outlawed, although possession is. And penalties are not specified, they are at the discretion of member countries, and can be milder or harsher than what is broadly indicated in the treaties. In practice, this flexibility has been used to create a prohibitionist, punitive war on drugs. Negative effects of this hardline approach have led to an increasing number of states bucking the conventions; actions range from alternative legal interpretations to outright defiance. The quite large scale of deviation, including dozens of countries, among them, the US, undermines the credibility of the drug conventions, which in turn, to some degree weakens the entire system of UN international treaties.[33][23]

Interpretation, compliance and deviation

As in other areas of international concern, interpretation of the drug conventions is "an art not a science". The conventions define "clear limitations [and] also provide a degree of latitude for policy choices at the national and subnational level." For instance, the Single Convention limits the use of controlled substances "exclusively to medical and scientific purposes", while providing exceptions and exemptions such as the cultivation of industrial hemp, the use of the coca leaf as a flavoring agent, and a general exemption of any drug used for "other than medical and scientific purposes".[34] One study addressing this latitude established three categories of deviation by party states: permissible policies deviate while being generally accepted, contested policies are vigorously defended as in fact being within the guidelines, and impermissible policies are clear breaches of the conventions.[11] Compliance with the UN drug conventions is also seen as creating risks to and violations of human rights laws.[35]

Decriminalization and personal use

In 2001, Portugal decriminalized purchase and possession for personal use of all psychoactive drugs. It maintained its treaty obligations by changing the form of prohibition from criminal law to administrative law, replacing criminal penalties, with fines, reporting requirements, and treatment referrals; drugs still had to be obtained from illegal sources, as selling remained a criminal act. Initially taking a negative view, the INCB in 2005 accepted the policy as legitimate, finding that "the practice of exempting small quantities of drugs from criminal prosecution is consistent with the international drug control treaties".[11][36]

Some two dozen countries have taken a similar approach to decriminalizing cannabis and other drugs for personal consumption.[37]

Legalization and regulated markets

In 2012, two US states, Colorado (Amendment 64) and Washington (Initiative 502), legalized cannabis. The INCB had warned, "to allow for the recreational use of cannabis would be a violation of international laws."[38] In August 2013, the federal government announced it would not act against states opening cannabis stores, with the expectation that state regulations would be ""tough in practice, not just on paper, and include strong, state-based enforcement efforts, backed by adequate funding."[39] The UN did not propose sanctions against the US.[38]

In 2013, Uruguay legalized cannabis, with the law taking effect in April 2014, making it the first country to do so. The INCB condemned the move and stated that Uruguay "knowingly decided to break the universally agreed and internationally endorsed legal provisions". The statement continued: "Cannabis is not only addictive but may also affect some fundamental brain functions, IQ potential, and academic and job performance and impair driving skills. Smoking cannabis is more carcinogenic than smoking tobacco."[38]

In 2018, Canada legalized cannabis, with the law taking effect that October.[40] In "A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada", it was acknowledged that "Canada is one of more than 185 Parties to three United Nations drug control conventions" and said: "... it is our view that Canada's proposal to legalize cannabis shares the objectives agreed to by member states in multilateral declarations", citing protection of vulnerable citizens, evidence-based policy, and public health, safety and welfare as "the heart of a balanced approach to treaty implementation."[41] The CND and INCB stated, "... this decision contravenes the provisions of the drug control conventions, and undermines the international legal drug control framework and respect for the rules-based international order."[42]

State reservations

In January 2012, Bolivia withdrew from the Single Convention over the indigenous use of the coca leaf. It soon re-applied to the convention with a reservation allowing traditional use of coca; the re-accession came into force in February 2013. Blocking the reservation required objection by 61 states, one-third of the, at the time, 183 parties to the convention; 15 countries objected by the deadline. The UNODC said it would "continue to work in Bolivia in accordance with its mandates to support the national system of drug control and the country's international cooperation in these matters."[43]

Modification and reform

Despite significant deviations from the conventions by upwards of two dozen countries, the prospect of fundamental amendments to the treaties seems distant at best, as the parties are roughly split between those who favor reform and those who adamantly back the existing hardline approach.[44][45] Provisions for treaty revision in the conventions allow changes to be easily blocked by states supporting a more prohibitive approach.[46]

With achieving the consensus required to amend the treaties unlikely, there remains the option of withdrawing and re-acceding with a reservation, as in the case of Bolivia and coca leaf. A second option is inter se treaty modification, provided for in the VCLT,[note 3] where two or more countries create a sub-treaty framework for, say, cannabis, and modify convention provisions to their needs; additional countries could accede at later dates.[47]

UNGASS directives

Three Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) sessions have been held on the subject of drugs: "Drug abuse" (1990), "World drug problem" (1998), and "World drug problem" (2016). These high-level gatherings, involving heads of state and ministers, are documented usually in the form of a political declaration, an action plan, or a strategy;[48] that provide additional treaty guidance.[8]

In March 2016, the INCB stated that the UN drug treaties do not mandate a "war on drugs" and that the choice is not between "'militarized' drug law enforcement on one hand and the legalization of non-medical use of drugs on the other", health and welfare should be the focus of drug policy.[49] That April, at the UNGASS on the "World drug problem", the Wall Street Journal assessed the attendees' positions as "somewhat" in two camps: "Some European and South American countries as well as the U.S. favored softer approaches. Eastern countries such as China and Russia and most Muslim nations like Iran, Indonesia and Pakistan remained staunchly opposed."[44] The outcome document recommended treatment, prevention and other public health measures, and committed to "intensifying our efforts to prevent and counter" drug production and trafficking, through, "inter alia, more effective drug-related crime prevention and law enforcement measures."[50][51] A statement signed by 189 civil society organizations criticized the 2016 outcome document, itemizing the lack of progress and calling out the "highly problematic, non-inclusive and non-transparent" process that made it possible for "a handful of vocal and regressive countries [to] block progressive language", and resulted in "an expensive restatement of previous agreements and conventions".[52]

Notes

  1. ^ One state, Chad, remains party to the unamended convention.
  2. ^ The VCLT, effective 1980, is not retroactive, however, many of its provisions are accepted as reflecting customary international law, which can apply to previously existing treaties. "When questions of treaty law arise during negotiations or litigation, whether concerning a new treaty or one concluded before the entry into force of the VCLT, the rules set forth in the VCLT are invariably relied upon by the States concerned, or the international or national court or tribunal, even when the States concerned are not parties to the VCLT."[1]
  3. ^ Before VCLT Article 41, there were no standardized rules for inter se modification, but certain practices could still be considered customary international law if they were widely accepted and followed by states: "only arid formalism would insist that a rule such as that contained in article 41 was not a 'rule of international law'." [2]

References

  1. ^ "Treaties". United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
  2. ^ a b c Armenta, Amira; Jelsma, Martin (Oct 8, 2015). "The UN Drug Control Conventions - A Primer". Transnational Institute. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
  3. ^ a b c d e "Global Drug Policy". Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Retrieved May 25, 2024.
  4. ^ "About Us". United Nations. Retrieved June 13, 2024. The UN's Membership has grown from the original 51 Member States in 1945 to the current 193 Member States.
  5. ^ a b c d "Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2023". International Narcotics Control Board. 2023. p. 17-18. Retrieved June 15, 2024.
  6. ^ a b "United Nations Treaty Collection: Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Convention on psychotropic substances". United Nations. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  7. ^ Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma 2012 "... the international legal drug control obligations, the room for manoeuvre the regime leaves open to national policy makers and the clear limits of latitude that cannot be crossed without violating the treaties [and] the vast grey area lying between the latitude and limitations, including the legal ambiguities that are subject to judicial interpretation and political contestation."
  8. ^ a b "Celebrating 60 Years of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and 50 Years of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971" (PDF). International Narcotics Control Board. February 2021. Retrieved June 19, 2024. The basis of this normative framework is the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. The 1961 Convention was followed by two more treaties: the 1971 Convention and the 1988 Convention. After 1988, with a view to implementing and complementing the conventions, the international community adopted a series of political declarations, plans of action and resolutions from 1990 to 2019"
  9. ^ a b c d e f Sinha, Jay (21 February 2001). "The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions". Senate of Canada. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
  10. ^ "Classification of controlled drugs". European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. Retrieved June 23, 2024.
  11. ^ a b c Bewley-Taylor, Dave; Jelsma, Martin (March 2012). "The Limits of Latitude" (PDF). Transnational Institute. Retrieved June 14, 2024.
  12. ^ "Commentaries on and official records of the conventions". United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved June 17, 2024.
  13. ^ "Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; New York, 30 March 1961". United Nations Treaty Series. IV "Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" (15). Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2022. Archived from the original on 8 September 2022. Retrieved 8 September 2022.
  14. ^ "Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; New York, 8 August 1975". United Nations Treaty Series. IV "Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" (18). Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2022. Archived from the original on 8 September 2022. Retrieved 8 September 2022.
  15. ^ "Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs". United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  16. ^ "UN commission reclassifies cannabis, yet still considered harmful". United Nations. December 2, 2020. Retrieved June 16, 2024.
  17. ^ "Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971". United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  18. ^ "United Nations Treaty Collection: Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances". United Nations. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  19. ^ Armenta & Jelsma 2015 "The 1988 Convention came about in the framework of the political, historical and sociological context of the 1970s and 1980s, leading to the adoption of more repressive measures. The increase in demand for cannabis, cocaine and heroin for non-medical purposes mainly in the developed world gave rise to large-scale illicit production in the countries where these plants had traditionally been grown, in order to supply the market. International drug trafficking quickly became a multi-billion-dollar business controlled by criminal groups. This rapid expansion of the illicit drug trade became the justification for intensifying a battle that soon became an all-out war on drugs."
  20. ^ "United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988". United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  21. ^ Lines, Rick; Elliott, Richard; Julie, Hannah; Rebecca, Schleifer; Tenu, Avafia; Damon, Barrett (June 2017). "The Case for International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Control". Health and Human Rights Journal. 19 (1): 231–236. PMC 5473052. PMID 28630555.
  22. ^ Sinha 2001: "Although the three Conventions do leave member countries some leeway to craft drug control strategies shaped to their particular socio-cultural, political and economic realities, this flexibility is clearly limited by an overarching structure based on prohibition and criminalization."
  23. ^ a b Krajewski, Krzysztof (1999). "How flexible are the United Nations drug conventions?" (PDF). International Journal of Drug Policy. 10 (1999): 329–338. doi:10.1016/S0955-3959(99)00035-3 – via Elsevier. There are currently three United Nations drug conventions in force ... All of these conventions take a clearly prohibitionist approach to the drug problem. Indeed, prohibitionist drug policies around the world have been modelled after these international conventions. ... . There should be no doubt that the purpose of these conventions is to introduce some sort of global prohibition.
  24. ^ Adelstone, Jason (Apr 27, 2022). "Highly Non-Compliant: Does Non-Medical Cannabis Legalization Really Fit within the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs? No, It Does Not!". Vicente LLP. Retrieved June 22, 2024. In fact, the Convention establishes a regime of both control and prohibition. It controls what is permitted and prohibits what is not. If it simply controlled without prohibition, all drugs could be regulated so long as they were controlled. This was obviously not the intent of the treaty.
  25. ^ Collins 2012, p. 50 "Although it is ultimately a multilateral construct, the shape and operation of the current treaty system is very much a result of American endeavour. The prohibitionist norm at the heart of the regime owes much to the successful internationalisation of the United States’ domestic approach – namely, that the recreational use of certain substances is morally wrong. Furthermore, the near universal levels adherence to the regime cannot be divorced from Washington’s support. States obviously perceive benefits from regime membership."
  26. ^ Hudak, John (April 7, 2016). "UNGASS and the consequences of international drug policy". Brookings Institute. Retrieved June 20, 2024. Much of the framework on international drug policy exists because of the forceful advocacy and insistence of the U.S. government on worldwide prohibition. That advocacy led to the most prominent international agreement on drugs: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs signed in 1961. ... The U.S.-driven, U.N. drug policy prescribes a one size fits all policy around drugs for a variety of substances throughout the world.
  27. ^ "The Commission on Narcotic Drugs". United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved 2024-06-15.
  28. ^ "The Commission on Narcotic Drugs". United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved 2024-06-15.
  29. ^ "United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs". United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved May 30, 2024.
  30. ^ INCB (2022). "Mandate and functions". www.incb.org. Archived from the original on 11 December 2022. Retrieved 2022-12-11.
  31. ^ "The Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2008" (PDF). International Narcotics Control Board. 2008. p. 6. Retrieved June 15, 2024. According to article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 'every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.'
  32. ^ Haase, Heather J.; Eyle, Nicolas Edward; Schrimpf, Joshua Raymond (August 2012). "The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to U.S. Drug Reform?" (PDF). New York City Bar Association (Committee on Drugs & the Law). Retrieved Apr 24, 2024. The Conventions are legally binding under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: a country "may not circumscribe its obligations under the treaties by enacting a conflicting domestic law."
  33. ^ Collins, John, ed. (October 2012). "Governing the Global Drug Wars" (PDF). London School of Economics. Retrieved June 20, 2024.
  34. ^ Riboulet-Zemouli, Kenzi (2022). High Compliance, a Lex Lata Legalization for the Non-Medical Cannabis Industry: How to Regulate Recreational Cannabis in Accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Paris and Washington, D.C.: FAAAT. ISBN 979-10-97087-23-4. SSRN 4057428.
  35. ^ Lines, R; Elliott, R; Hannah, J; Schleifer, R; Avafia, T; Barrett, D (June 2017). "The Case for International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Control". Health and Human Rights Journal. 19 (1): 231–236. PMC 5473052. PMID 28630555. The international drug control treaties contribute directly to this environment of human rights risk and violations. The drug treaties are what are known within international law as "suppression conventions." Suppression regimes obligate states to use their domestic laws, including criminal laws, to deter or punish the activities identified within the treaty, and are therefore "important legal mechanisms for the globalization of penal norms." However, while suppression treaties mandate all states to act domestically and collectively to combat crimes defined as being of international concern, they offer no obligations and little guidance on what is and is not an appropriate penal response. ... In many cases, this is an invitation to governments to enact abusive laws and policies, especially in a global context where drugs and drug trafficking are defined as an existential threat to society and the stability of nations ...
  36. ^ Laqueur, Hannah (2014). "Uses and Abuses of Drug Decriminalization in Portugal" (PDF). Law & Social Inquiry. Retrieved June 14, 2024.
  37. ^ "Approaches to Decriminalizing Drug Use & Possession" (PDF). Drug Policy Alliance. February 2015. Retrieved June 18, 2024.
  38. ^ a b c Nelson, Steven (December 11, 2013). "Uruguay Violating Treaties By Legalizing Marijuana, U.N. Agency Says". U.S. News & World Report. Retrieved June 11, 2024.
  39. ^ Nelson, Steven (August 29, 2013). "DOJ: Marijuana Stores Can Open in Colorado and Washington". U.S. News & World Report. Retrieved June 11, 2024.
  40. ^ Butler, Patrick (Oct 17, 2018). "Cannabis is legal in Canada — here's what you need to know". CBC News. Retrieved June 16, 2024.
  41. ^ McLellan, A. Anne; Ware, Mark A.; Boyd, Susan; Chow, George; Jesso, Marlene; Kendall, Perry; Souccar, Raf; von Tigerstrom, Barbara; Zahn, Catherine (November 30, 2016). "A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada". Government of Canada. Retrieved June 16, 2024.
  42. ^ "Statement attributable to the UNODC Spokesperson on Canada's Cannabis Act". United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. June 21, 2018. Retrieved June 16, 2024.
  43. ^ "Bolivia to re-accede to UN drug convention, while making exception on coca leaf chewing". United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved June 18, 2024.
  44. ^ a b Fassihi, Farnaz, "U.N. Conference on Drugs Ends Without Shift in Policy", Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2016. Retrieved 2016-04-25.
  45. ^ Bewley-Taylor, D. (2020). "Politics and Finite Flexibilities: The UN Drug Control Conventions and their Future Development". AJIL Unbound. 114. Cambridge University Press: 285–290. doi:10.1017/aju.2020.56 – via Cambridge Core. Mindful of the glacial pace of systemic change within the UN and international law in general, it seems unlikely that we will witness substantive formal change to the drug control regime any time soon. ... As observation of debates and attendant divisions at the CND suggest, reaching a new global consensus necessary to amend the conventions to allow for regulated cannabis markets is not realistic in the foreseeable future, if ever.
  46. ^ Bewley-Taylor, David R. (April 2003). "Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities" (PDF). International Journal of Drug Policy. 14 (2): 171–179. doi:10.1016/S0955-3959(03)00005-7. ... changing the regime is problematic. The provisions concerning treaty revision in all the Conventions permit those nations supporting the current prohibition based system to easily block change. Within the UN drug control system procedures and politics are inextricably entwined.
  47. ^ Bewley-Taylor 2020.
  48. ^ Ruder, Nicole; Nakano, Kenji; Aeschlimann, Johann (2017). Aeschlimann, Johann; Regan, Mary (eds.). The GA Handbook: A practical guide to the United Nations General Assembly (PDF) (2nd ed.). New York: Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations. pp. 14–15. ISBN 978-0-615-49660-3.
  49. ^ INCB Report 2015 Archived April 26, 2017, at the Wayback Machine United Nations Information Service 2.3.2016.
  50. ^ "Outcome Document of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem" (PDF). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2016. Retrieved Apr 9, 2024.
  51. ^ "Public Statement by the Global Commission on Drug Policy on UNGASS 2016", Press release, April 21, 2016. Retrieved 2016-04-25.
  52. ^ "The UNGASS outcome document: Diplomacy or denialism?". Transnational Institute. March 14, 2016. Retrieved June 27, 2024. The UNGASS process has failed to recognise the lack of progress achieved by international drug control over the past 50 years – substances under international control are more widely available and affordable than ever. It has failed to acknowledge the damage caused by current approaches: systemic human rights abuses, and continued use of the death penalty for drug offences; exacerbation of HIV and hepatitis C transmission; intolerably inadequate access to controlled drugs for medical purposes; 187,000 avoidable drug-related deaths each year; violence, corruption and killings perpetuated by criminal drug markets; systemic stigmatisation of people who use drugs; destruction of subsistence farmers' livelihoods by forced crop eradication; and billions of dollars of public money wasted on drug policies that demonstrably do not work.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)


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